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 Introduction 
The Geneva based 'International Organization for Standardization' was constituted in 1946; 
however, unlike many of the other post-World War II international institutions (e.g., United 
Nations, IMF, World Bank, International Health Organization, International Civil Aviation 
Organization) this organization has experienced its most striking success over the last two 
decades. The ISO 9000 certification system for firm quality was introduced in 1987, and by the 
end of 2002 some 560,000 certificates had been awarded to sites in 159 nations (Corbett, 2003). 
In short, ISO 9000 (sometimes simply referred to as ISO here) certification for firm quality has 
been far-and-away the most successful and widespread set of standards implanted by the 
'International Organization for Standardization' (Casper & Hancké, 1999; Mendel, 2002).  
The remarkable spread of ISO has spawned a recent literature that attempts to define what 
drives the global diffusion of ISO 9000 certification (e.g., Guler et al., 2002; Mendel, 2002; 
Corbett, 2003) and ISO 14000 – a sister-standard for environmental processes – certification 
(e.g., Delmas, 2000, 2002; Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Corbett & Kirsch, 2001; Prakash & 
Potoski, 2006a, 2006b). With regard to ISO 9000 standards (the focus of this study), a number of 
diffusion drivers have been identified: the role of government directives (particularly the EU), 
government agencies mandating contractor adoption, Multinational Enterprises requiring supplier 
adoption, and extensive adoption by trading-partner and trading-competitor nations. Yet, the 
macro-level economic impact of ISO 9000 certification has been an under-investigated topic.
We aim to look not at the macro-level drivers of ISO 9000 adoption and diffusion, but 
instead consider the economic impact of ISO 9000 adoption on country-pair economic 
relationships. More specifically, we are interested in how the adoption of ISO 9000 standards 
influences the two primary means (trade and foreign direct investment) by which firms conduct 
cross-border economic activity. ISO 9000 standards – via their quality-signaling, common-
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 language, and conflict-settling properties – potentially alter the costs involved with trade and 
foreign direct investment activity. In short, ISO 9000 may reduce the transaction costs and 
information asymmetries involved with arms-length interactions between businesses from 
different nations (thereby, enhancing trade) and with engaging in international greenfields, joint-
ventures and acquisitions (thereby, enhancing FDI).  
 This paper is organized as follows in order to support the analysis. We begin by setting 
the research question in the International Business (IB) literature, giving credit to New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) insights as conceptually fundamental, and supporting the ISO 
9000 system as representative of an international institution. Next, we consider the properties of 
ISO 9000 and generate formal propositions with respect to how diffusion may directly impact 
country-pair trade flows and FDI stocks. Further, we analyze the potential for the ISO effect to 
depend on the type of country-pair; i.e., whether the proposed effects hold systematically. We 
then employ panel data on trade and FDI reported by OECD nations, discuss estimation issues, 
and empirically test the impact of ISO 9000 adoption on country-pair economic relationships. 
Finally, we conclude and discuss. 
 
A New Institutional Analysis of ISO 9000 in an International Business Context 
International Business researchers have for quite some time been interested in the factors 
that affect cross-border economic relationships. Dunning’s (1981, 1988) OLI paradigm helps 
both contextualize and conceptualize the importance of institutional factors: in particular, the 
location-specific advantages of host country environments represent the key influence as to 
where foreign production takes place, as they create climates that facilitate an MNE exploiting its 
ownership-specific and internalization advantages. Both non-institutional factors (e.g., market 
size, market growth, labor costs, production costs, transportation costs, natural resources, and 
 2
 distance) and institutional factors (e.g., governance structures, trade barriers, FDI specific 
policies, macroeconomic policies, political stability, and tax regulations) have been identified in 
the literature as prominent location-advantages (Sethi et al., 2003; Li & Resnick, 2003). The 
range of potential institutional factors is, accordingly, quite extensive: from the well studied 
importance of political constraints on executive discretion that secure property rights (e.g., 
Henisz & Zelner, 2001; Henisz, 2002) to exploratory notions on how antitrust policy might 
impact foreign direct investment (Brewer, 1993; Li & Resnick, 2003).  
A striking omission in the above list of location-advantages is the status of managerial 
practice in the host nation environment. Clearly, foreign investors will not only consider factors 
like the natural resources, human resources, and political context in a country, but also consider 
the general excellence of managerial practice in that same environment. While the empirical 
literature on factors driving FDI has neglected the importance of managerial practice and 
standards, these factors have, nevertheless, been explored conceptually. For instance, Dunning 
(2001: 181) notes that commercial infrastructure and business culture certainly enhance location 
attractiveness. Consider also the recent IB scholarship that stresses the existence of FDI 
motivated by MNE’s looking to gain access to resources and capabilities; hence, some studies 
(e.g., Anand & Kogut, 1997; Anand et al., 2005) examine the geographical pull of host country 
skills. While these skills are typically considered to be embodied in the capabilities of workers, 
Anand and Kogut (1997) observe that a nation’s capabilities also reside in firms and industrial 
networks; and that IB researchers often ignore the important role played by resources embedded 
in firms. Consider also, the recent call by Ricart et al. (2004) for the JIBS community to embrace 
the importance of specialized intermediaries: institutions that help consummate transactions by 
reducing the information asymmetries and transaction costs involved with identifying the relevant 
resources embedded in firms. 
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 Our main interest resides in how the diffusion of ISO 9000 practices – the internationally 
recognized standard for quality management – impacts the economic relationships between 
countries. By empirically considering the impact of ISO 9000 diffusion on both FDI and trade in 
international country-pair environments, we hope to add to the extensive IB literature on location 
advantages. Furthermore – and akin to the recent IB literature that identifies firm-based sources 
of capabilities – we think it important to consider the properties of firms and the role of 
institutional intermediaries. In our case, the overall properties of firms in a particular national 
environment and the intermediary role played by the ISO 9000 system might impact the macro-
level phenomenon of cross-country trade and FDI. In short, we argue that the diffusion of 
internationally recognized managerial practices in a country – in addition to natural, human and 
political resources – represents an important factor that drives FDI and trade decisions. 
Before delving further into our analysis of the potential impact of ISO 9000 diffusion, it 
behooves us to institutionally ground our analysis via two additional means. First, we must lay 
out how institutions are considered by New Institutional Economics scholars (e.g., Williamson, 
1985; North 1990), as that perspective (focusing on how alternative forms of governance 
economize on transaction costs) represents the core theoretical backdrop to our analysis. Second, 
we must establish the accuracy of understanding the ISO 9000 system as an institution – at least 
an informal-decentralized international institution – in order to engage in such an analysis. 
 
New Institutional Economics 
The work of Robert Coase and Oliver Williamson is fundamental to the NIE perspective. 
Coase (1937) identified transaction costs as explaining why some exchanges were done within 
firms, and others were governed by markets. Williamson (1975, 1985) expanded on Coase’s 
work by identifying bounded-rationality and individual opportunism as heightening transaction 
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 costs and eliminating exchange from the market. Institutions play a critical role in NIE 
scholarship, as they reduce uncertainty by providing dependable and efficient frameworks for 
economic exchange (North, 1990). The ‘New Institutionalism’ in organizational theory and 
sociology (see Scott, 1995 and DiMaggio & Powell, 1991 for good reviews) has one particular 
concern with the NIE approach that is germane to our study: institutions and organizations do not 
necessarily lead to beneficial outcomes. Instead, New Institutionalism holds that actors often 
construct institutions that never manifest the desired outcomes. For instance, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983: 147) state that “forms of organization change occur as the result of processes that 
make organizations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient”.  
In line with the NIE approach and the New Institutionalism critique, we will stress the 
external – not the internal – benefits of ISO 9000 certification. Hudson and Jones (2003: 1004) 
observe that ISO 9000 may generate benefits “both because quality is more effectively signaled 
and also because there may be an actual increase in quality [and/or] better cost control”. Writing 
from the New Institutionalism tradition, Walgenbach (1998) found – from interviews with 
German quality managers – that ISO 9000 certification generated very little change in actual 
quality or efficiency. A number of survey-based studies in specialty journals also elicit similar 
findings with respect to the internal benefits of certification (Simmons & White, 1999; Juran, 
1999). Furthermore, Delmas (2002) notes that firms seek ISO 9000 irrespective of whether they 
expect actual quality improvements. Terziovski et al. (2003) begin to make sense of the mixed 
internal performance record for ISO 9000 by observing that firms at early stages of the quality 
process may find certification to spawn internal benefits, but companies with good quality 
systems may find ISO 9000 certification to generate internal losses due to the added costs, delays 
and burdensome documents necessary for certification. Accordingly, we will not analyze the 
impact of any potential efficiency or quality improvements due to certification, but instead focus 
 5
 simply on external benefits. While the internal effects of ISO 9000 certification might be 
complementary to the external effects, neglecting potential internal benefits is consistent with our 
NIE approach (focusing on the external problems of transaction costs and information 
asymmetries), consistent with New Institutionalism's critique (efficiency is often not realized), 
and consistent with the literature on ISO’s internal benefits (a mixed performance record). 
In sum, we engage in an NIE analysis of the ISO 9000 system as the NIE approach is well 
suited to making sense of institutional remedies for transaction cost and information asymmetry 
problems: the heart of our interest in ISO’s potential beneficial impact on FDI and trade. We 
move forward then with the idea that institutions (and the ISO 9000 system in particular) emerge 
or take specific forms to solve problems and facilitate commerce. Yet, we remain open to New 
Institutionalism's charge that new forms may not generate the intended consequences: i.e., ISO 
9000 diffusion may not lead to the intended benefits vis-à-vis trade and FDI. 
 
ISO 9000 as an International Institution 
 Douglas North (1991: 97) defines institutions as humanly devised constraints that 
structure economic interaction and consist of both informal constraints (e.g., sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules to create order and reduce uncertainty 
in exchange. Hence, an important breakthrough with the NIE approach was recognizing the 
importance of both formal and informal institutions (Henisz & Williamson, 1999). Prior 
scholarship generally neglected the importance of informal institutions by essentially taking a 
formal-legalism approach to institutional analysis: “a central role for formal rule or laws enacted 
and effectively enforced by a hierarchical authority” (Yarbrough & Yarbrough, 1990). Indicative 
of the importance of both informal and decentralized institutions, North (1991: 100) argues that a 
mixture of voluntary and semi-coercive institutions enabled long-distance trade in the Middle 
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 Ages. Accordingly, despite the voluntary and decentralized nature of the ISO 9000 system, it is 
very much an institution. In fact, ISO 9000 is indicative of a trend toward increased private sector 
involvement in areas of governance that had traditionally been part of the state. Neumayer and 
Perkins (2005: 239) observe that “in the absence of a global state, the task of designing, 
implementing, and enforcing standards has been increasingly assumed by various regional and/or 
global institutions, some of which are nongovernmental”. King et al. (2005) concur when they 
surmise that the ISO management standards represent examples of decentralized institutions. 
Understanding the ISO 9000 system as an international institution can be further 
enhanced by considering the discourse within International Political Economy (IPE). The domain 
of IPE focuses on the social, political and economic arrangements that impact the global systems 
of production and exchange: i.e., what institutional conditions promote international cooperation 
(Strange, 1988; Krasner, 1983; Keohane 1984). For IPE scholars, international regimes (i.e., 
international institutions) represent multilateral agreements that promote cooperative behavior, 
regulate relations, and stabilize the international order in particular issue areas. Dimaggio and 
Powell (1991) – in surveying New Institutionalism’s impact on IPE – note that some international 
institutions are formal organizations, while others are complex sets of rules, standards and 
agencies. Dimaggio and Powell further note that regimes are institutions in that they build upon, 
homogenize and reproduce standard expectations. Accordingly, IPE scholars could consider the 
‘International Organization for Standardization’ and its’ ISO 9000 standard as an international 
regime. But ISO’s formal inclusion of non-state actors (industry and consumer representatives) 
suggests that this international institution must be understood in a post-Westphalian sense 
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 (Keohane, 1984); thus, ISO is an international regime not wholly dependent on nation-states 
(Bernstein & Cashore, 2000; Perez, 2004; Börzel & Risse, 2005).1
Furthermore, the decentralized nature of the ISO 9000 system yields some estimation 
benefits when it comes to empirical testing. Consider the dichotomous nature of most 
institutional conditions: i.e., you are either in or out. Rose (2004) cites this dynamic as crucial to 
his finding the WTO to have no significant impact on trade flows.2 One of the problems with a 
dichotomous measure for institutional membership is that it cannot capture significant variation 
in institutional commitments: e.g., non-members to an institution attempting to join probably 
exhibit different behavior than non-members with no ambition of joining.3 A decentralized 
institution – like ISO 9000 – that depends on the choices of a myriad of local firms allows us to 
elicit a finer measure of effective national commitments to institutional principles. In short, the 
greater the diffusion of ISO 9000 practices in a country, the greater the essential commitment to 
those managerial principles in that national environment.  
 
Country-Pair Trade Flows 
 The stated objective behind the formation of the International Organization for 
Standardization was to promote the development of standards in order to facilitate international 
trade in goods and services (Hayes, 1994). Additionally, the diffusion of ISO 9000 reportedly 
received a great boost by the EU’s use of the standard to accelerate establishment of a single 
market (Conti, 1999; Anderson et al., 1999). At the firm-level, it has been argued that businesses 
                                                 
1 Other IPE scholars (e.g., Prakash & Potoski, 2006a, 2006b) conclude that ISO is more non-governmental 
organization (NGO) than regime due to its multiple stakeholder nature and non-traditional negotiation strategies; yet, 
NGOs are also a type of institution. 
2 See http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/Eureka.htm for an interesting insight into how Andrew Rose came to the 
conclusion that gaining entry into a club may not actually generate intended benefits. 
3 We could imagine differences in commitments by members as well: some ‘very’ and others ‘moderately’ 
committed to an institution. 
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 consider the improvement—or maintenance of—international sales as a motivation behind 
adopting ISO (e.g., Simmons & White, 1999; Guler et al., 2002). If the above motivations are 
founded on accurate assessments of the benefits of ISO certification, then ISO 9000 diffusion 
should generate enhanced international trade at the macro-level. 
While our research focus resides in the macro-level – not micro-level – effects of ISO 
9000 diffusion, it behooves us to consider the micro-foundations behind how ISO certification 
affects the relationships between businesses that hail from different nations. Foss and Pedersen 
(2004) underscore the importance in IB of identifying explanatory mechanisms at deeper levels. 
Additionally, Snowdon and Stonehouse (2006) – in reviewing Michael Porter's contributions – 
highlight the importance of grounding theoretical constructs in actual behavior. Basing our 
theoretics on micro-foundations is pivotal as “nations do not trade but firms do” (Murray et al., 
1995: 195). Accordingly, we focus here on three particular properties (quality signal, common 
language, and conflict settling) by which ISO adoption may enhance trade between firms from 
different nations and thereby enhance country-pair trade. 
First, ISO 9000 firms can credibly claim that they have a documented quality system that 
is implemented and followed: ensuring that products are made to exacting specifications (Guerin 
& Rice, 1996). While Rao et al. (1997) find cross-national evidence supporting ISO certification 
as positively impacting firm quality, Conti (1999: 458) reports that the quality assurance elements 
of ISO 9000 help in business-to-business contractual relations “when a supplier’s capability to 
design and supply conforming products need to be demonstrated”. Terlaak and King (2006) argue 
that ISO can signal a firm’s superior but unobserved attributes—in line with this argument, they 
find ISO certification to increase facility growth when buyers face multiple suppliers and the 
attributes of suppliers are intangible. Foreign suppliers of intermediary products clearly manifest 
difficulties in demonstrating product quality: informational, linguistic, cultural, regulatory and 
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 managerial barriers all conspire to enhance ‘liability of foreignness’ when one considers 
purchasing from foreign suppliers. In short, ISO 9000 offers a ‘low-cost’ signal of a firm’s 
commitment to quality. Accordingly, the signaling implications of ISO certification help reduce 
trade barriers between businesses from different nations and thus facilitate trade by reducing the 
search costs involved with identifying quality valuing foreign suppliers. 
Second, ISO certification has been reported to facilitate communication between 
businesses: i.e., it involves common-language properties (Casper & Hancké, 1999; Dissanayaka 
et al., 2001; Grajek, 2004). ISO 9000 certification ensures that an organization has a documented 
quality management system that is codified into a comprehensive manual (Mendel, 2002). 
Consequently, certification establishes an efficient-means to both communicate internal systems 
to customers and provide a common procedural language to be used across organizations. Not 
only does ISO 9000 provide purchasers with a means (language) to decipher a firm’s 
commitment to quality, but the purchasing firm is freed from designing and paying-for the quality 
system (Hayes, 1994). The common-language properties of ISO 9000 thus represent an efficient 
improvement upon the situation where each business customer specifies unique requirements for 
quality control. For instance, the adoption of the ISO standard by the U.S. auto firms for their 
supplier relations eliminated three other quality standards (Anderson et al., 1999). In this vein, 
Chen et al. (2006) empirically support that exporters concentrate on fewer foreign markets when 
they must comply with separate country-specific standards. Accordingly, the common-language 
properties of ISO certification help reduce trade barriers between businesses from different 
nations by allowing for the ready communication of a firms production system and by 
eliminating costly multiple quality standards. 
Third, codified procedures a la ISO 9000 may also help settle – and reduce – 
organizational disputes, as the authority of the documented system can “be employed overtly in 
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 everyday battles of organizational contestation” (Mendel, 2002: 414). Lee (1998) reports ‘better 
team spirit’ and ‘less staff conflict’ as prominently cited benefits of ISO adoption. Casper and 
Hancké (1999: 968) argue that ISO “makes links between different production units more 
transparent and, hence, more easily amenable to improvement”. Consider how Matthews (1986) 
departs from Williamsonian opportunism by emphasizing the purely cognitive costs of organizing 
and monitoring transactions even when participants are honest. Accordingly, ISO can help clarify 
situations where faults are unintended and not due to opportunistic behavior; thus, preventing 
escalation of inter-organizational conflict. As evidence, Hayes (1994: 56) reports that executives 
from ISO-adopting firms consider certification to signal that they are “easier to deal with”. The 
ISO working procedures help clarify the division of labor and responsibilities involved with 
complex inter-organizational production, and by doing so minimize inter-organizational conflict. 
Accordingly, the conflict-settling properties of ISO certification help reduce trade barriers 
between businesses from different nations by setting reasonable working procedures that smooth 
inter-firm relations and reduce instances of conflictual holdup. 
 In sum, we argue here that the ISO 9000 program helps standardize practices and 
terminology, mobilize resources, and structure efforts across organizations. The quality-signal, 
common-language and conflict-settling properties lower the transaction costs and information 
asymmetries involved with business-to-business relations across borders, thus making arms-
length trading relations less costly. Conti (1999: 455) suggests these effects when he states “ISO 
9000 stemmed from the need to rationalize quality issues in contractual business-to-business (or 
business-to-administration) relations”.  
Implicit throughout the above discussion is that ISO’s mitigation of the transaction-cost 
and bounded-rationality problem is most germane for the home-country (what we sometimes 
refer to as the ‘push effect’) when it comes to country-pair trade. ISO 9000 adoption in the home-
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 nation signals the overall quality and reliability of exports (the quality-signal, common-language 
and conflict-settling effects); hence, we would expect home-nation diffusion of ISO certification 
to robustly ‘push’ exports in various country-pairs. ISO 9000 adoption in the host-nation (what 
we sometimes refer to as the ‘pull effect’) should involve the common-language and conflict-
settling properties discussed above (i.e., it will be easier to sell to firms that speak the same 
language and involve less risk of dispute); yet, the quality-signaling implications are likely to be 
absent for the host-effect. In general, home-nation firms would likely exhibit, at-best, moderate 
concern as to whether their customers were ISO certified or not; instead, selling firms are simply 
generally open to sending their products to whoever is willing to pay the going price. In other 
words, we hypothesize that ISO adoption matters more on the selling-end of the transaction than 
on the buying-end of the transaction.4 From the micro-foundations outlined above, we can 
generate three simple macro-level propositions: 
Proposition 1a: Home-nation diffusion of ISO 9000 certification (the selling-end) is  
likely to generate enhanced exports within country-pair economic relationships. 
Proposition 1b: Host-nation diffusion of ISO 9000 certification (the buying-end) is  
likely to generate enhanced exports within country-pair economic relationships. 
Proposition 1c: The impact of home-nation diffusion (the selling-end) is likely to be  
more robust than the impact of host-nation diffusion (the buying-end).  
 
Country-Pair FDI Positions 
While we have focused to this point on the effects of diffusion on trade, Neumayer and 
Perkins (2005: 239) note that the goal of ISO 9000 “has been to facilitate international trade and 
                                                 
4 In line with the diffusion literature where ISO is found to be a ‘do as I say not as I do’ phenomenon: i.e., firms that 
have ISO-certified suppliers are no more likely to be certified than firms with non-ISO-certified suppliers. See King 
et al. (2005) for a discussion focusing on the selling-end’s importance; though, they focus on ISO 14000 adoptions. 
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 investment by harmonizing otherwise diverse and conflicting national standards with 
international ones”. Accordingly, ISO 9000 diffusion may also impact country-pair FDI stocks by 
affecting the costs involved with engaging in foreign investment. Recall that FDI consists of both 
joint-ventures (JVs) and wholly owned subsidiaries—where wholly owned subsidiaries can be 
obtained via acquisition or greenfield. We analyze the potential impact of ISO adoption on FDI 
while considering the same three ISO properties: quality-signal, common-language and conflict-
settling. As with the trade propositions, we consider the firm level micro-foundations behind how 
the three ISO properties may lower the costs of foreign direct investments. More specifically, we 
analyze how ISO 9000 certification lowers the transaction costs and information asymmetries 
involved with firms making foreign investments. By attempting to explore the micro-foundations 
behind how ISO certification reduces the costs of engaging in joint-ventures, acquisitions and 
greenfields, we base our theoretical propositions on deeper-level explanatory mechanism. 
 First, the quality-signal properties of ISO 9000 may be of assistance to firms interested in 
making FDI decisions. High information barriers exist regarding the assessment of other firms’ 
quality-properties—barriers which are further heightened when those firms reside in foreign 
nations. To the degree that ISO 9000 represents a low-cost signal of a firm's commitment to 
quality in its premises, this directly impacts the costs of engaging in international joint-ventures 
and acquisitions. Recall that inadequate target evaluation (and the lack of a quality pre-
acquisition decision process) is often credited to be a factor in failed acquisitions and JVs 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Hitt et al., 1998; Srivastava & Datta, 2006). For instance, Hitt et 
al. (1998) make clear that Ecolab’s unsuccessful acquisition of Chemlawn was driven by 
Chemlawn’s low managerial and worker productivity—something only discovered post-
acquisition. Related to the practice of neglecting target evaluation, Singh (2006) recently pointed 
out that business scholars have failed to delineate the actual drivers of target selection. Ricart et 
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 al. (2004) implicitly argue that the role of essential institutional intermediaries – which help 
consummate transactions by evaluating quality and matching potential buyers and sellers – is one 
place to begin looking for the drivers of target selection.  
We submit here that ISO 9000 certification provides a quality-signal that reduces the 
search costs involved with identifying ‘quality valuing' firms to either purchase or joint-venture 
with. It should be stressed that we do not consider ISO 9000 certification to be the penultimate 
standard of production quality nor the only indicator which firms might use to search for JV and 
acquisition partners: witness, for instance, the fact that ISO certification is for a plant or premise 
and not a firm, hence it will be – depending on the nature of the transaction – a noisy signal at 
times. Yet, Hudson and Jones (2003) highlight that standards do not have to generate full 
confidence or full information on the part of buyers to be helpful; instead, as long as they convey 
some information and are cost efficient, they become one signal included in the optimal signaling 
set. We argue then that ISO 9000 represents an important – though not the only – signal that 
reduces the information barriers and transaction costs with regard to finding foreign firms (or 
plants/premises) with which to engage in partnerships and M&As. 
While the analysis above highlights the impact of ISO 9000 on the joint-venture and 
acquisition forms of FDI, it should be made clear that ISO 9000 diffusion may also impact 
greenfield-type foreign investments. Almost all forms of FDI will rely on the internal markets in 
the host environment to provide some inputs into the production process. Yet one of the chief 
barriers to undertaking a greenfield foreign investment is the inability to detect what firms in the 
host environment can be valuable up-stream suppliers by providing quality inputs: this represents 
one of the principal liabilities of foreignness, and is why many firms seek to acquire local 
knowledge and contacts through acquisitions and JVs. Akin to our constructs in the trade section, 
 14
 ISO 9000 diffusion in a host environment reduces the search costs involved with identifying good 
local suppliers and by doing so lowers the costs of engaging in greenfield-type FDI.  
 Second, the common-language properties of ISO 9000 may be of assistance to firms 
interested in making FDI decisions. Recall that both practitioners (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993) 
and scholars (e.g., Shrivastava, 1986; Hunt, 1990; Datta, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Larsson & 
Finkelstein, 1999) generally agree that inadequate integration represents the single most 
important factor in explaining failure in acquisitions and JVs. Moreover, integrating firms and/or 
units from different nations generates further challenges due to the distance in culture and 
managerial practices (Geringer, 1988; Brown et al., 1989; Fey & Beamish, 2001). Nevertheless, a 
great deal of research finds similarity between firms to enhance integration and thereby enhance 
success (e.g., Harrigan, 1988; Brown et al., 1989; Datta, 1991; Fey & Beamish, 2001). Coff 
(2002) sums the above up well when he argues that you need some type of related experience to 
successfully acquire and integrate strategic assets. Fey and Beamish (2001) go further to uncover 
the organizational foundations behind the positive relationship between firm-similarity and 
successful-integration of JVs and acquisitions. In particular, Fey and Beamish find differences in 
managerial practices and values to generate process losses—losses that derive from ineffective 
communication, uncertainty over control systems, and difficulties over organizing work; hence, 
organizational costs increase substantially when you attempt to integrate dissimilar organizational 
climates via an M&A or JV.  
 We submit here that ISO 9000 certification provides a common language (i.e., common 
routine, shared experience, similar climate, etc.) that helps firms from different nations 
consummate (i.e., successfully integrate) international acquisitions and joint-ventures. The 
common language properties assist firms with regard to inter-firm cooperation by enhancing 
communication, reducing uncertainty with regard to control systems, and providing a common 
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 approach to organizing work. In support of this conjecture, Bergman (1994) provides a number of 
examples from the healthcare industry where similarity in quality management systems eased the 
integration of new joint-ventures and acquisitions; she states “these management tools can be 
useful when working out the big and little details of joint ventures, mergers and similar 
negotiations” (1994: 44). Furthermore, Shani and Rogberg’s (1994) case-based research finds 
ISO 9000 to be helpful in addressing the internal change brought on by a merger. In short, ISO 
9000 provides a language by which integrating entities can use to peer inside and communicate 
with each other, and thus aids the all-important integration process. 
 Third, the conflict-settling properties of ISO 9000 may be of assistance to firms interested 
in making FDI decisions. While we covered above the pivotal need for integration if a JV or 
M&A is to succeed, integration is often fraught with tensions for the employees of acquired firms 
or junior joint-venture partners. In particular, acquired entities are customarily required to 
substantially alter their organizational style: i.e., they bare the brunt of the change in terms of 
operations, control, planning systems and procedures, and even human resource issues (Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Accordingly, the formal controls necessary for 
substantive integration may breed resentments on the part of acquired firms’ employees—
resentments which manifest themselves in poor morale, employee stress, increased absence, 
employee turnover and lowered productivity (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993). Larsson and Lubatkin 
(2001) point out that acquiring firms face a tradeoff between ‘properly integrating’ and 
‘harmoniously acculturating’ the new acquisition—an acquirer, simply put, can not have both. In 
fact, recent research suggests that the greatest employee resistance is elicited when the success of 
the inter-firm combination depends on gains from integrating similar production and marketing 
operations (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999); hence, the above tradeoff is most present exactly when 
integration is most necessary. 
 16
 We submit here that ISO 9000 certification might mitigate the conflicts (i.e., employee 
resistance) noted above and allow integration to take place without substantial tensions. This 
dynamic owes to ISO certification on the part of target firms potentially meaning that less change 
is necessary for target-firm employees; hence, less conflict will result from integration. Related to 
the common-language properties previously discussed, ISO certified target firms will have 
systems in place which allow the acquiring firm to gain information and take control of the firm; 
thus, less resentment-augmenting change will be required during the integration process. In fact, 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) empirically support management style similarity to increase both 
organizational-integration and employee-cooperation; and further find organizational-integration 
and employee-cooperation to generate merger synergies. Larsson and Finkelstein conclude that 
“when management styles are similar across organizations, the level of cooperation is often 
enhanced and perceptions of the degree of change taking place may be cushioned” (1999: 8); 
thus, the cooperation of the new employees allows interaction and coordination to take place 
which in turn increases the likelihood of success. In short, to the degree that ISO certification 
smoothes relations between integrating firms from different nations (attenuating employee 
resistance yet allowing integration to take place), this directly lowers the costs of engaging in 
international joint-ventures and acquisitions. 
 We previously proposed that ISO’s mitigation of the transaction-costs involved with trade 
would be more robust for home-nations (the selling-end) than for host-nations (the buying-end). 
The disproportionate effect of ISO 9000 diffusion on the selling-end is likely to be replicated for 
FDI; however, with FDI the buying-end (now the home-nation) and selling-end (now the host-
nation) are reversed. To illustrate the imbalance between the host-nation and home-nation effects, 
consider the quality-signal benefits of ISO diffusion on FDI. ISO diffusion in the host-nation 
environment reduces the search costs involved with identifying 'quality-valuing' local firms to 
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 either purchase, joint-venture with, or source inputs from (i.e., the costs of foreign acquisitions, 
JVs, and greenfields are all reduced); thus, we would expect ISO adoption in the host-country to 
robustly 'pull' FDI via the quality-signal effect. Yet, the diffusion of ISO in the home-nation 
environment should only significantly affect joint-venture type FDI: where it would be in the 
interest of firms in the host-country to make efficient pairings with ISO certified firms from the 
home-country. Host-nation firms interested in being acquired are unlikely to fully value ISO 
9000 certification of home-nation suitors; instead, price will be the overwhelming criteria by 
which to judge suitors. In other words, a target firm will be relatively uninterested in the degree 
to which an acquiring firm can signal its quality and relatively more interested in the bottom-line: 
no price discount will be given to ISO certified bidders. The same type of dynamic will be 
present for Greenfield-type FDI: where host-nation suppliers are unlikely to discriminate between 
ISO-certified and non-ISO-certified home-nation MNEs interested in buying their products. 
Accordingly, host-nation adoption of ISO 9000 provides clear benefits for home-nation 
firms interested in going abroad to engage in international JVs, acquisitions and greenfields: the 
quality-signal, common-language and conflict-settling effects should all help illuminate the target 
environment for outward FDI. Yet, home-nation adoption of ISO 9000 provides relatively few 
benefits for home-nation firms interested in making foreign direct investments—the benefits 
being mostly restricted to home firms seeking international joint-ventures. In other words, we 
again hypothesize that ISO adoption matters more on the selling-end of the transaction than on 
the buying-end of the transaction. From the micro-foundations outlined above, we can generate 
three simple macro-level propositions: 
Proposition 2a: Home-nation diffusion of ISO 9000 certification (the buying-end) is  
likely to generate enhanced FDI within country-pair economic relationships. 
Proposition 2b: Host-nation diffusion of ISO 9000 certification (the selling-end) is likely  
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 to generate enhanced FDI within country-pair economic relationships. 
Proposition 2c: The impact of host-nation diffusion (the selling-end) is likely to be more  
robust than the impact of home-nation diffusion (the buying-end).  
 
Country-Pair Heterogeneity 
An analysis of how ISO 9000 impacts FDI and trade in country-pair economic 
relationships cannot end with the idea that the direct effects of ISO diffusion universally hold. 
We must also factor that ISO’s proposed effect on FDI and trade may vary in intensity across 
different types of country-pairs. In a recent paper, Blonigen and Wang (2004) focus directly on 
the question of whether it is appropriate to empirically pool data from different nations; 
moreover, they find that “the underlying factors that determine the level of FDI activity vary 
systematically across LDCs and DCs" (2004: 17). Thus, Blonigen and Wang deliver the message 
that it is inappropriate to assume that FDI plays the same role in developing nations as it does in 
developed nations. While not the focus of their research, a few IB researchers (Sethi et al., 2003; 
Globerman & Shapiro, 2003) have also found the impact of their explanatory constructs on FDI 
to vary substantially between developed and developing nations.  
There appears then to be empirical support behind the need to differentiate between 
developed and developing nations when one studies the drivers of FDI. Indicative of the 
importance of this finding, Kobrin and Wu (2005) recently observed that the Blonigen-Wang 
prescription to not automatically pool country-pair data is quickly becoming common knowledge 
and practice. It should be pointed out that the Blonigen-Wang insight is a new one; hence, the 
theoretical justifications behind the developed/developing distinction and the potential for other 
types of distinctions (e.g., transition nations, newly industrial countries, colonial legacy etc.) have 
gone unstudied. Mindful that other types of distinctions are possible, we nevertheless consider 
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 whether our proposed ISO effects hold for both developed and developing nations. Furthermore, 
we will propose two theoretical justifications as to what might be behind any 
developed/developing distinction when it comes to ISO’s influence on trade and FDI.  
First, the fact that developed and developing nations tend to experience different types of 
FDI and trade may partly contribute to any developed/developing distinction. Horizontal FDI 
(foreign direct investment in the same industry abroad as the firm’s domestic industry) is 
generally found when the home and host nations have similar attributes (factor endowments, 
level of development and size); in practice, this means that FDI between two developed nations 
tends to be horizontally-based. Further, higher trade costs tend to generate higher levels of 
horizontal FDI; hence, trade is often considered a substitute for horizontal FDI. Vertical FDI 
(investment abroad to source inputs or sell outputs from home production) is generally found 
when the home and host nations have dissimilar attributes; in practice, this means that FDI from a 
developed home-nation to a developing host-nation tends to be vertically-based. Further, higher 
trade costs tend to generate lower levels of vertical-FDI; hence, trade is often considered a 
complement for vertical FDI. Accordingly, the fact that developing nations tend to experience 
more vertical-type relations in their trade and FDI, while developed nations tend to experience 
more horizontal-type relations in their trade and FDI might then influence the impact of ISO 9000 
diffusion. Recall that transaction cost and holdup problems tend to be most germane in vertical 
relationships where the buyer – as well as the seller – is a firm (Williamson, 1985). We might 
then expect the influence of ISO certification to be most robust in vertical-type economic 
relationships (i.e., in developing nations), as this is where transaction cost and information 
asymmetries can be most problematic.   
Second, the fact that developed and developing nations tend to differ with regards to the 
presence of institutional intermediaries may also partly explain any developed/developing 
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 distinction. Ricart et al. (2004) note that developing nations often experience institutional voids 
(defined as a shortage of the specialized institutional intermediaries needed to consummate 
transactions); in particular, the lack of soft institutions via which to locate possible transaction 
partners undercuts commerce. For instance, consider that government agencies, trade 
associations, commercial banks, and export management companies often perform information-
gathering and matchmaker services for domestic firms desiring to expand overseas via exporting 
and/or investment (Hill, 1998). These services play instrumental roles in bridging the financial, 
logistical, business-practice and cultural divides that are endemic to international business. Yet, 
these services that help mitigate the information asymmetry and transaction costs of international 
trade and FDI are less prevalent in the developing world. In this vein, Anderson and Marcouiller 
(2002) make the argument that capital-abundant nations trade disproportionately with each other 
– and not with capital-poor nations – specifically because they have the strong institutions which 
support trade security. Simply put, governments in developing nations find it more difficult to 
financially support such public services and the market options (e.g., commercial banks, and 
export management companies) are less evolved in the developing world; ironic, in that 
developing nations are the very locations where such services would be most valuable. While 
Delmas (2002) posits that the developing world’s lack of institutions might dampen diffusion of 
ISO certification, we want to point out that what diffusion actually taking place will involve 
significant effects due to the dearth of other institutional means via which to reduce information 
asymmetries and transaction costs. Accordingly, we might expect the influence of ISO 
certification to be most robust in vertical-type economic relationships (i.e., in developing 
nations), as this is where fewer substitutes exist for ISO certification. 
In sum, we submit here that firms from developing nations will face substantial 
challenges in readily conveying product-quality, internal production processes and conflict free 
 21
 relations due to two reasons: the vertical nature of their international economic relationships; and 
the shortage of institutions to help mediate transaction cost and information asymmetry problems. 
Thus, ISO certification of firms located in the developing world will be helpful in attracting 
developed-world customers for exports and developed-world buyers for investment purposes; i.e., 
the beneficial effects of ISO diffusion will be most robust in developing nations. A simple 
proposition captures the argument above: 
Proposition 3: The impact of ISO 9000 diffusion on both trade and FDI is likely to be 
greatest in developing nations as compared to developed nations. 
 
Data Issues 
Data for our empirical analysis are compiled from different sources including UN’s 
‘Comtrade’, IMF’s ‘International Financial Statistics’, World Bank’s ‘World Development 
Indicators’, World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Competitiveness Report’, and others—see table 
#1 for the full list of variable definitions and sources. The primary data consist of bilateral (i.e., 
country-pair) trade flows and FDI stocks over the 1995-2002 period. While trade data is available 
for virtually all country-pairs, the bilateral FDI data is reported solely by OECD nations—though 
the OECD nations report the FDI stocks in both directions for their economic relationships with 
both non-OECD and OECD nations. Accordingly, the home-nations and host-nations for the 
various country-pair economic relationships include then 52 OECD and non-OECD members. 
The majority of macro-level empirical scholarship on FDI has employed OECD, U.S. or 
Scandinavian data. The U.S. and Scandinavian data are generally regarded as having better 
quality due to the ability to distinguish affiliate sales in the host market. We employ the OECD 
data, because looking only at the U.S. or Scandinavian data would leave us with little variation in 
terms of home-nation ISO 9000 adoption; thereby, substantially limiting the ability to investigate 
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 both the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ performance of ISO 9000 (see Ekholm, 1995; Brainard, 1997; 
Blonigen et al., 2003 for discussions of similar issues). While the OECD Statistical Compendium 
reports both FDI flows and stocks, we employ the stock data as the flow data involves 
repatriation of profit issues that can lead to inappropriate measurement of a particular nation’s 
foreign investment position. Additionally, Hejazi and Safarian (2001) point out that stock data 
has the added advantage of mitigating simultaneity issues between FDI and trade. 
Our explanatory variables aim to control standard factors driving export and FDI activities 
beyond the proposed ISO 9000 effects: gravity force (GDP), infrastructure (airline passengers 
carried, paved road network, and electricity production), financial and wealth conditions (relative 
exchange rate, and relative stock market index), political risk (Henisz’s (2002) veto-points 
index), trade costs (tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and presence of free trade agreements), 
labor costs (hiring and firing practices), and capital costs (presence of bilateral investment 
treaties, and restrictions to foreign capital market access). Table #2 reports summary statistics for 
our full list of variables. An array of other factors is implicitly taken into account by means of 
fixed country-pair and period effects. Country-pair specific effects account for common border, 
common language, colonial ties, and other unobserved factors that do not vary over the sample 
period. Period specific effects account for variation in world GDP and other annual trends. 
One tradeoff involved with the extensive list of control variables is that each variable 
contains a number of missing observations. Moreover, the missing observations for each control 
variable unfortunately do not line up: e.g., hiring-and-firing practices may be missing for 
Argentina but present for Uruguay, yet network of paved roads may be present for Argentina but 
missing for Uruguay. Accordingly, the number of feasible observations drops significantly (by 
over 90%) when the full set of control variables are included in the estimations. We face then a 
tradeoff between having a large sample and having a rigorous estimation procedure with a 
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 number of controls. Our model specification, which we carefully explain in the next sections, 
needs to strike a balance between the sample selection problem and the benefits of including an 
extensive set of control variables.  
 
Estimation Issues 
 We build and estimate a system of two gravity equations for both FDI and exports. In 
order to properly estimate the two gravity equations, it behooves us to return to the nature of the 
FDI-trade relationship, as this directly determines the proper estimation technique for the two 
equations. As already alluded to, it is appealing to consider the trade-FDI relationship to be 
substitutable where horizontal FDI dominates (e.g., developed-developed country-pairs), and 
complementary where vertical FDI dominates (e.g., developed-developing country-pairs). Recall 
also that empirical scholarship found horizontal FDI to outweigh vertical FDI; hence, scholars 
were surprised when early empirical work began to find a complementary—as opposed to a 
substitutable—relationship between trade and FDI (Hejazi & Safarian, 2001). Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) began the process of reconciling these findings by pointing out that much of that empirical 
work suffered from endogeneity by regressing exports on an indicator of direct investment 
activity. More specifically, the complementarity findings may be driven by unobserved variation 
in tastes, technology, comparative advantage and government policy which could all create a 
positive correlation between trade and FDI.  
A more recent empirical literature takes into account the above endogeneity issues and 
continues the debate over the complementarity (see Clausing, 2000; Head & Ries, 2001) or 
substitutability (see Belderbos & Sleuwaegen, 1998; Blonigen, 2001) of trade and FDI. The 
Blonigen (2001) study is particularly important: using product-level data, he identifies 
substitution (as well as complementarity) between trade and FDI. He suggests that the inability 
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 for some researchers to find substitution rests both with an aggregation-bias and with substitution 
effects being a sudden – not gradual – phenomenon. Accordingly, we move forward with the idea 
that trade and FDI exhibit a substitutive relationship that can best be detected via exogenous price 
indicators; though, we are mindful that complementarity will also be at play in our country-pair 
level data. As seen below, this pulls us in two different econometric directions. 
The substitution argument roughly corresponds to idealized horizontal FDI; or more 
specifically, to the decision whether to supply a foreign market with arms-length trade or with 
foreign-subsidiary sales. This decision will be determined by the relative costs associated with 
the two types of foreign presence modes. From the econometric viewpoint, trade flows and FDI 
are not interdependent—e.g., FDI does not cause trade—in an idealized horizontal world. They 
are, however, jointly determined, which naturally leads to Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) model. Moreover, each of the control variables – which directly affect the cost 
of at least one foreign presence mode – will appear in both the FDI and export equations, since 
what matters in choosing between substitutes is relative costs. The resulting SUR model will then 
have identical regressors. Error terms are also likely to be correlated across the two equations due 
to omitted variables (the factors affecting trade might also affect FDI via the substitution 
argument) and common shocks. 
The complementarity argument better corresponds to a state where cross-border economic 
activity is vertical in nature: driven by parts of the value chain being located in different nations 
due to production efficiency. Complementarity between trade and FDI leads to a different 
econometric specification than that for the substitutability of exports and FDI (i.e., the horizontal 
world). In this case, the decision to move production abroad comes prior to the trade decision: 
first, you establish foreign subsidiaries for sourcing home production; second, you source the 
foreign subsidiaries with inputs and then re-import processed goods. In other words, a direct 
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 causal relationship exists between FDI and trade in an idealized vertical world, as FDI outward 
stocks ‘cause’ both incoming and outgoing trade flows. However, no reciprocal causality exists in 
this context, as trade does not cause FDI. This implies a triangular model (see Lahiri and 
Schmidt, 1978, for the estimation of triangular systems) in the econometric context: FDI 
variables appear in the export equation, but trade variables do not appear in the FDI equation.  
As we are not able to separate out the horizontal and vertical type activities in our 
country-pair level data, our model must simultaneously account for both activities. Unfortunately, 
the two models—SUR with identical regressors and a triangular model—cannot be nested and 
consistently estimated in a single model without further restrictions. Estimating a triangular 
model generally requires the application of instrumental variable techniques to account for 
endogeneity; in the current context, the endogeneity of FDI in the export equation. The horizontal 
nature of the trade/FDI relationship, however, suggests that what impacts trade will also impact 
FDI; thus, rendering identification of the export equation parameters impossible.5  
Ignoring the vertical-world (i.e., omitting the inward and outward FDI variables from the 
export equation) and estimating the SUR model with just exogenous indicators of the relative 
attractiveness (i.e., prices) of operating abroad via exports or FDI represents one possibility. 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) advocate such an approach; and in light of our previous discussion, we 
could interpret this approach as the estimation of a reduced form model. Although 
econometrically correct, a reduced form model yields difficulties in interpreting coefficient 
estimates. In particular, we would not be able to distinguish the direct effect of ISO diffusion on 
exports from the indirect effects of ISO diffusion on exports via FDI. 
Another possibility involves assuming uncorrelated error terms across equations, thus 
leading to a special type of triangular model known as a recursive model. An appealing feature of 
                                                 
5 Technically speaking, the order condition fails. 
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 the recursive model is that structural parameters are easily identified. The right-hand side 
parameters in the FDI equation are identified due to exogeneity of the independent variables. 
Hence, FDI serves as its own instrument in the export equation, as it is a linear combination of 
exogenous variables and the FDI equation’s error term is uncorrelated with the export equation’s 
error term. The assumption of uncorrelated errors is, however, a strong one. As we mentioned 
earlier, it would be violated in the presence of omitted variables and common shocks to trade and 
FDI. An additional benefit of such an approach is that the complementarity-driven indirect effects 
in the export equation should be channeled through the inward and outward FDI variables, rather 
than through the other explanatory variables. We stress ‘should’, however, as the broad nature of 
the FDI data (not distinguishing between vertical and horizontal FDI) suggests that these vertical 
effects may be difficult to fully control. Bearing in mind the potential endogeneity problem, we 
follow the recursive approach. The FDI and export equations then read: 
ijtijtFDIijt
OUT
ijt XFDI ψθκγ +++= 'ln ,                 (1) 
,           (2) 
where the subscripts i, j, and t respectively stand for home nation, host nation, and year. In order 
to apply standard estimation techniques, the gravity equations (1) and (2) are log-linearized. 
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ijt includes the logged values of all regressors identical across equations. Additionally, 
we include time effects (λt and κt) and country-pair specific effects (ηij and θij). Such an approach 
allows for autocorrelated and heteroscedastic error terms, but not for correlation across equations. 
Under these assumptions, we can consistently estimate equations (1) and (2) with equation-by-
equation OLS after removing from the data the unobserved heterogeneity imbedded in the 
country-pair specific effects. Primarily, we use a within transformation leading to fixed-effects 
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 estimators; though alternatively, we apply first differencing. Furthermore, all regression 
estimations are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation by using robust standard errors. 
 To conclude this section, we need to acknowledge that three additional sources of 
endogeneity exist beyond the interdependence of trade and FDI in our gravity equations system.  
First, the gravity force itself is subject to endogeneity problems as exports necessarily enter GDP 
in national accountings. Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) report, however, that correcting for the 
endogeneity of GDP with instrumental variables makes very little difference to coefficient 
estimates. Second, our research focus is on the macro-level impact of ISO diffusion on trade 
flows and FDI stocks; yet, we would like to be able to make inferences with regard to the micro-
level: the agents (firms) that make trade and FDI decisions. For instance, we would appreciate 
some degree of confidence that it is the ISO certified firms that are actually engaging in more 
exports and foreign investment. Exogeneity of the ISO variables would allow us to interpret the 
coefficient estimates as indicating whether ISO certified firms actually experience increased 
international business activity at the micro-level. 
Third, and most importantly, endogeneity may owe to reciprocal causation between ISO 
9000 diffusion and both FDI and exports. Recall that the dominant literature on ISO 9000 
attempts not to explain diffusion effects but to explain diffusion drivers. For instance, Guler et al. 
(2002) find ISO adoption in trading-partner and trading-competitor nations, and a nation’s overall 
inward (though not outward) FDI to enhance ISO 9000 diffusion in a particular country. We 
instead hold that trade and FDI benefit from ISO standardization due to lower transaction costs 
and information asymmetries; yet, Casella (1996) notes that the standardization process might be 
determined by intensity of foreign trade and FDI (both of which indicate the openness of an 
economy). Our country-pair level of analysis somewhat mitigates this problem, however, as the 
level of trade and FDI in one particular country-pair is unlikely to have a large effect on national 
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 diffusion of ISO 9000. Recall that the Guler et al. (2002) results suggest that overall trade and 
FDI intensity drive national ISO adoption, but do not suggest that one particular country-pair 
economic relationship would generate a strong influence on national diffusion.  
We apply Sims-type and Hausman-type exogeneity tests in order to support the above 
intuitions: (1) validity of a recursive econometric approach; (2) likely trivial impact of gravity 
forces on endogeneity; (3) ability to make inferences with regard to the micro-level; (4) mitigated 
concern over reciprocal causation. First, we run a Sims test procedure that incorporates lead 
explanatory variables to the estimated equation and tests their joint significance (see Wooldridge, 
2002 for the fixed-effects model application). The underlying logic is that future explanatory 
variable realizations should not affect present exports and FDI. Finding such a relationship 
indicates a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption, thus rendering fixed-effects’ estimators 
inconsistent. Second, we apply a Hausman test to a comparison of the fixed-effects coefficients 
with the first-differencing coefficients. Under strict exogeneity, both estimators are consistent and 
have the same probability limit; thus, finding a significant difference between the two estimates 
indicates violation of strict exogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). We apply both tests to all the 
explanatory variables as a group (see ‘overall’ in the tables), and then simply for the two ISO 
variables (see ‘ISO’ in the tables) of primary interest.  
 
Empirical Results 
As already introduced, we follow a panel data approach that allows accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity pervading cross-sectional studies. Beyond our main fixed-effects 
estimations (table #3), we also estimate all regression equations while using a first-differencing 
method (table #4). Comparing in detail first-differencing with the fixed-effects results allows a 
means of checking the robustness of the primary fixed-effects estimations. Following Blonigen 
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 and Wang (2004), we distinguish between three distinct country-pair types: developing to 
developed (LDC Æ DC), developed to developing (DC Æ LDC), and developed to developed 
(DC Æ DC).6 Accordingly, each table presents six specifications: with one trade and one FDI 
equation for each type of country-pair. Furthermore, since all variables in the estimated equations 
(1) and (2) are in logs, we can interpret the coefficients in tables’ #3 and #4 as elasticities. The 
period and the country-pair specific effects are suppressed for the fixed-effects estimations. 
The previously mentioned sample-size/extensive-controls tradeoff – along with space 
limitations – requires us to make a choice concerning what empirical results to present. 
Unreported empirical estimations support the robustness of the ISO effects to the sequential 
introduction of all control variables one at a time; yet, such results are too cumbersome to present 
succinctly. Accordingly, we decided to take a conservative approach (the ‘from general to 
specific’ variable selection process) that strikes a balance between sample selection and rigorous 
estimation. In the first step, we selected only the control variables – beyond the central ISO and 
gravity forces – that were statistically significant in the particular FDI and trade equations (the 
unreported estimations noted above) when only one control variable was included at a time.7 In 
the second step, we eliminated one-by-one the control variables that turned out to be insignificant 
in both the trade and FDI equations for a given country-pair type; thus, in line with the 
substitutability of trade and FDI, we keep control-variable-symmetry across trade and FDI 
equations for each country-pair type. As a result, the equation specifications reported in table #3 
include control variables that are symmetric across trade and FDI equations for each country-pair 
type and significant in at least one – trade or FDI – equation. 
                                                 
6 We follow Blonigen & Wang’s distinction between developed and developing nations. The 20 developed nations in 
our sample include Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US. Note that it was also 
possible with our data to elicit ‘some’ developing to developing (LDC Æ LDC) country-pairs; though, we dropped 
such pairs due to small observation numbers and lack of clear priors from the theoretical literature. 
7 These ‘full’ estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
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 Given that endogeneity is a potential concern in our econometric analysis, table #3 reports 
a series of diagnostics that indicate the severity of the problem. Reviewing the results, we find 
endogeneity to be somewhat evident for the explanatory variables as a whole. The Sims-test for 
regression #4 and the Hausman-tests for regressions #1 through #4 indicate endogeneity 
potential. As we pointed out in the previous section, no easy solution exists for constructing 
instrumented variables due to our inability to separate out the vertical from the horizontal 
activities with our data. Consequently, we are unable to consistently estimate the hypothesized 
effect of vertical FDI on triggered trade flows: i.e., the coefficient estimates on inward and 
outward FDI in the export equation are unreliable (e.g., the FDI variables in table #3 are mostly 
insignificant). Yet, we do generally find the ISO variables to be exogenous in the estimated 
equations—with the exception of ISO’s Hausman-test in regression #1. While we need to further 
consider the indication in regression #1, the diagnostics generate confidence in the core focus (the 
ISO effects) of the paper. In short, the diagnostics suggest that our equations – particularly the 
export equations and the developing-to-developed FDI equation – suffer from some endogeneity; 
yet importantly, the ISO variables of primary concern do not appear to be the problem variables. 
The examination of coefficient estimates for the standard factors driving trade and FDI 
provides another validity check for our results. Here, we discuss the fixed-effects results for both 
the main and selected control variables: GDP, inward & outward FDI, infrastructure, capital 
market access, and hidden trade barriers. 
Interestingly, we find that our main controls – the gravity forces – work asymmetrically in 
the estimated equations: GDP appears to pull exports much stronger than push exports. The 
strong ‘pull’ effect on exports is stable across different country-pair types; though, the relatively 
weaker home-nation ‘push’ effect is only present in the equations considering exports to 
developed nations (table #3, regression #1 & #3). These findings—strong ‘pull’ and weak 
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 ‘push’—conform to the pre-existing empirical literature using panel data techniques to estimate 
gravity-based trade equations (e.g., Freund and Weinhold, 2004). In terms of the FDI equations, 
the host-nation GDP ‘pull’ also seems relatively stable across different types of country-pairs, but 
is insignificant in the developing-to-developed country-pairs (regression #4): where the 
econometrics are weakest and where we lack precedent theoretics. Additionally, we do not find 
the ‘push’ (home-nation GDP) to be significant for the FDI equations in table #3. Furthermore, 
our controls for FDI-driven trade – outward and inward FDI stocks in the trade equations – are 
mostly positive, as expected, but only significant for inward FDI in regression #2.  
Host-nation infrastructure, as proxied by number of airline passengers, is positive and 
significant in the export equation for all country-pair types (except LDC Æ DC), and negative, 
though generally insignificant, in the FDI equations. Similar results are found for the paved-road-
network infrastructure variable, though only in the developed-to-developed country-pairs. These 
findings conform to the expectation that infrastructure improvements boost both horizontal-type 
and vertical-type trade. Furthermore, it appears that the negative effect of infrastructure on 
horizontal FDI (via the substitution of trade for FDI when infrastructure costs are low) is 
potentially countervailed by the positive effect of infrastructure on vertical FDI.  
Foreign capital market access (host_FCM) also turned out to be among the factors that 
significantly affected cross-border economic activities for developed-to-developing country-
pairs. The positive and significant coefficient estimates in table #3 for the exports and FDI 
equations (regression #2 & #5) suggests that lax restrictions regarding the access to capital 
markets in developing nations spurs both imports and FDI from developed nations. This 
conforms to the expectation that financial market openness (via easier billing procedures, profit 
repatriation, etc.) reduces the cost of doing business for both importers and foreign investors. 
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 Finally, hidden trade barriers – as measured by the World Economic Forum’s trade cost 
index (host_TCI) – turned out to be significant in the developing-to-developed FDI equation 
(table #3, regression #4). Hence, fewer hidden-trade-barriers in developed nations generate 
greater FDI from developing nations. While this estimate is consistent with how vertical-type 
FDI will respond positively to the lowering of trade costs, it should be treated with extreme 
caution for a few reasons. As already alluded to, regression #4 indicates the poorest econometric 
performance among our set of estimated equations. Notice that this is the only equation where 
both the Sims and Hausman tests reject exogeneity of the ‘overall’ explanatory variables. The R2 
in this equation is also much lower than in the other table #3 regression equations. Furthermore, 
the coefficient estimate for hidden-trade-barriers is not significant in the first-differenced 
estimations (table #4, regression #4). The inconsistent results do not surprise given the relative 
lack of theoretical guidelines for FDI from developing nations to developed nations. 
We should also point out that a number of control variables were significant when 
introduced one at a time (recall our explanation of the variable selection process), but lost 
significance when we simultaneously introduced additional controls. Accordingly, the following 
control concepts are absent from table #3 but did indicate significance in other estimations: host-
nation tariffs in the developed-to-developing export equation; electricity production, real 
exchange rate, and the Henisz (2002) index of political constraints in the developed-to-
developing FDI equation; and the relative stock market index in the developed-to-developed 
exports equation. Moreover, the narrow nature of our panels (only eight years) makes it difficult 
to elicit sufficient variation in many of these standard control concepts. Accordingly, the fact that 
these controls were not robust enough to be introduced in the presented estimations does not 
suggest that they are unimportant drivers of cross-country economic activity. 
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 Having discussed the performance of our control variables, we can finally turn to the 
impact of ISO 9000 diffusion on trade and FDI—the focus of the paper. The empirical results 
presented in table #3 indicate three areas where ISO diffusion significantly impacts trade and 
FDI: home-nation ISO in LDCÆDC exports; host-nation ISO in DCÆLDC FDI; and host-nation 
ISO in LDCÆDC FDI. 
First, the fixed-effects coefficient estimate on home-nation ISO adoption is significant and 
positive in the developing-to-developed export equation (regression #1). The results of the 
diagnostic tests point, however, to some concern about strict exogeneity of our explanatory 
variables in general and the exogeneity of the ISO variables in particular: both Hausman test 
statistics are significant. This calls for a detailed examination of the first-differencing results 
(table #4) where the ISO ‘push’ in the developing-to-developed export equation is confirmed by a 
significant coefficient estimate. Note that the ISO ‘push’ effect is significantly lower in table #4 
(0.063) than in table #3 (0.116). This might be due to the ISO variable accounting for the impact 
of other trending omitted variables in the fixed-effects estimation. First-differencing, by 
eliminating deterministic time trends, is more immune to such effects. Moreover, the difference 
between the fixed-effects and first-differencing coefficient estimates for home-nation ISO may 
also be due to the samples not fully overlapping: i.e., we lose many observations when first-
differencing unbalanced panels (from 868 to 613 in our case). Wooldridge (2002) notes that 
positive Hausman tests may owe to inconsistent sampling between the fixed-effects and first-
differencing estimations. The bottom line is that we should treat the magnitude of the ISO ‘push’ 
effect in table #3 with caution, yet be reassured as to the significance of this effect. 
Second, the fixed-effects coefficient estimate on host-nation ISO diffusion is significant 
and positive in the developed-to-developing FDI equation (regression #5). The diagnostics (both 
the Sims and Hausman tests) also indicate exogeneity for the explanatory variables as a whole 
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 and for the ISO variables in particular; plus, the first-differencing coefficient estimate in table #4 
corroborates. Hence, ISO diffusion in developing host-nations appears to robustly attract FDI 
from developed nations.  
Third, the fixed-effect coefficient estimate for host-nation ISO is significant and negative 
in the developing-to-developed FDI equations (regression #4). This result suggests that ISO 
diffusion in developed nations acts a barrier to foreign investment from developing nations. 
Recall from our discussion of hidden-trade-barriers that regression #4 is the most troubling 
estimation in terms of econometrics (both the Sims and Hausman tests indicate endogeneity) and 
theoretics (where the phenomenon of FDI from the developing world to the developed world is 
not well studied). Moreover, the significance of this effect does not hold up in the first-
differencing estimation (table #4, regression #4); hence, we treat this weak and puzzling result as 
a statistical artifact. 
Our empirical results also yield evidence concerning our proposed expectations for how 
ISO diffusion would impact cross-country economic relationships: 
• Per Proposition 1a and 2b, we expected ISO diffusion in the selling-end (the home-nation 
for exports and the host-nation for FDI) to respectively generate increased trade and FDI. 
The empirical results provide some evidence in favor of these propositions in the 
developing-to-developed exports equation and the developed-to-developing FDI equation.  
• Per Proposition 1b and 2a, we expected ISO diffusion in the buying-end (the host-nation 
for exports and the home-nation for FDI) to respectively generate increased trade and 
FDI. The empirical results reject these propositions, as nowhere does buying-end ISO 
diffusion enhance trade or FDI.  
• Per Proposition 1c and 2c, we expected ISO diffusion in the selling-end to be more robust 
than the buying-end. Evident from above, the empirical results do provide some evidence 
in favor of the selling-end effects being most robust.  
• Per Proposition 3, we expected the above ISO effects to be most pronounced in 
developing nations. The empirical results provide strong evidence in favor of this 
expectation, as the positive effects of ISO 9000 on the selling-end of the transaction—
home-nation for exports and host-nation for FDI outward positions—in the developing 
world are confirmed. 
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 In sum, our results support the hypothesized benefits of ISO 9000 adoption (the quality-
signal, common-language and conflict-settling properties) empirically manifesting themselves on 
the selling-end of both trade and FDI transactions. Moreover, splitting the sample into different 
country-pair types, per Blonigen and Wang (2004), elicits strong support for the heightened 
importance of ISO diffusion in developing nations. Accordingly, the emergence of the ISO 
institution in developing nations seems to be quite effective in solving the information asymmetry 
and transaction cost problems involved with FDI and trade. We were not able, however, to 
clearly tease out vertical from horizontal cross-border activities; thus, the mixing of these 
activities in our data partly explains the endogeneity in our econometric analysis. Still, the main 
empirical findings concerning the effects of ISO diffusion seem undisturbed by endogeneity. 
 
Conclusion & Discussion 
 Motivated by the lack of literature analyzing the macro-level impact of ISO 9000 
diffusion, we set out to study the effects of a nation’s ISO certification on country-pair economic 
relationships. We suggest three properties of ISO 9000 (quality signal, common language, and 
conflict settling) that ease the costs of conducting cross-border trade and investment. We also 
posit that these ISO effects will be more robust in developing nations, as firms from these nations 
face particularly high information asymmetries and transaction costs both when exporting and 
when attempting to attract foreign investment. Empirical tests based on data covering the 
country-pair trade flows and FDI stocks of OECD nations over the 1995 to 2002 period yield two 
major findings: 1) ISO 9000 diffusion in developed nations does not appear to enhance trade and 
FDI between nations; 2) ISO 9000 diffusion in developing nations does appear to enhance trade 
(exports to developed nations) and FDI (investment from developed nations) between nations. 
The empirical results yield a number of implications—four of which we discuss here. 
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 First, our results may contribute directly to the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
scholarship that considers how institutions play a complementary role to other institutions. 
Milgrom et al. (1990) found that the medieval institutions of judges and champagne-fairs helped 
further the effectiveness of the ‘reputation system’ used at that time to reduce the transaction 
costs of exchange. They state “institutions sometimes arise to make … [a] mechanism more 
effective by communicating information” (Milgrom et al.,1990: 19). The ISO 9000 quality 
system appears to be an example of an institution whose principal aim is to convey information to 
a community. In the case of ISO, the community consists of worldwide businesses interested in 
either exporting or investing abroad, and ISO appears to complement the WTO system—at least 
in the developing world. The ISO 9000 system may then assist the WTO in realizing its’ stated 
goal: help exporters, importers, and producers of goods and services conduct their business. 
Second, our results also generate clear policy implications for developing nations if we re-
consider our empirical findings from a country’s perspective. Recall that ISO diffusion in 
developing-nations was found to have a positive ‘push’ with regard to exports to developed 
nations, and to not significantly ‘push’ outward FDI to developed nations. ISO diffusion in 
developing-nations was also found to have a positive ‘pull’ with regard to inward FDI from 
developed nations, and to not significantly ‘pull’ in imports from developed nations. Taking this 
from a developing country’s perspective—where the nation will be both a home and a host to 
international economic flows—suggests the following: large scale adoption of ISO generates 
increased exports to (but not significant increased imports from) developed nations, and increased 
inward FDI from (but not significant increased outward FDI to) developed nations. Hence, from a 
neo-mercantilist (or developmental) point of view, ISO diffusion in a developing nation appears 
to generate the two public policy goals (increased exports and increased investment interest from 
abroad) that reside behind the foreign economic policies of many nations. 
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 Third – and related to the above discussion on developing-nation policy implications – 
our results provide some evidence as to where the principal benefits of globalization amass. 
International Business scholars (e.g., Eden & Lenway, 2001; Buckley & Ghauri, 2004) have 
recently expressed concern as to whether the benefits of globalization accrue to the relatively rich 
(capital exporting) countries or to the relatively poor (capital importing) countries. Many pundits 
and scholars (see Dunning, 2003) have opined that developed nations benefit substantially from 
globalization, while developing nations experience few – if any – benefits. Our results are 
striking in that they support the global diffusion of ISO 9000 practices to be beneficial for 
developing nations; hence, the global diffusion of managerial practices potentially ameliorates – 
not exacerbates – global inequalities of wealth. 
Fourth, our results speak to two additional International Business dialogues: the long-
lasting dialogue on location advantages, and the recent dialogue on institutional intermediaries. 
The empirical results suggest that institutional intermediaries can indeed play a fundamental role 
in supporting commerce. In our case, the diffusion of ISO 9000 managerial practices (an 
informal-decentralized international institution) in developing nations generates increased inward 
FDI from developed nations and enhanced exports to developed nations. These findings conform 
to the prior that firms in developing nations face substantial barriers to earning both export 
markets and foreign investment interest due to insufficient government or market remedies for 
transaction-cost based problems. In other words, the impact of ISO 9000 is quite robust in 
developing nations where – due to institutional voids – few substitutes exist. The ISO 9000 
system appears then to be an important factor affecting cross-border economic relationships; thus, 
international institutions that signal managerial quality may represent an important location 
advantage that helps explain the destination for FDI and the source of trade flows.  
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Table #1 Variable definitions. 
Variable Source Definition 
Exports UN’s Comtrade Exports from home to host country (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
FDI_out OECD Statistical 
Compendium 
Home country’s FDI stock in host country (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
FDI_in OECD Statistical 
Compendium 
Host country’s FDI stock in home country (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
home_GDP IMF’s IFS Home country’s GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
host_GDP IMF’s IFS Host country’s GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
home_ISO ISO(2003) Number of home ISO 9000 certifications 
host_ISO ISO(2003) Number of host ISO 9000 certifications 
host_Passengers World Bank’s WDI Number of passengers carried by aircrafts departing from host country’s 
airports per capita 
host_Road World Bank’s WDI Total network of paved roads per sq. km in host country 
host_Electricity World Bank’s WDI Host country’s electricity production (in kWh per capita) 
rel_REER IMF’s IFS Real effective exchange rate based on relative consumer prices (higher 
value indicates real depreciation of home vs. host currency) 
rel_SMI World Bank’s WDI Relative stock market index given by market capitalization of home 
relative to host country 
host_Polcon Henisz (2002) Index of political constraints in host country based on veto points 
(higher value indicates tighter control over politicians’ decisions) 
host_TCI World Economic 
Forum’s GCR 
Trade cost index reflecting hidden barriers to imports of host country 
(1=highest, 7=lowest) 
host_Tariffs OECD Statistical 
Compendium and 
World Bank’s WDI 
Custom and other import duties as a fraction of total imports in host 
country; OECD data were used if available, otherwise World Bank’s 
data. 
host_FCM World Economic 
Forum’s GCR 
Restrictions to access foreign capital markets in host country (1=highest, 
7=lowest) 
host_HF World Economic 
Forum’s GCR 
Hiring and firing practices in host country (1=impeded by regulations, 
7=flexibly determined by employers) 
BIT UN Bilateral investment treaty between home and host nation (0/1) 
FTA Baier & Bergstrand 
(2006) and sources 
listed there 
Free trade agreement between home and host nation (0/1) 
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Table #2 Summary statistics. 
LDC→DC DC→LDC DC→DC 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev  Obs. Mean Std. Dev  Obs. Mean Std. Dev 
Exports 968           2038.7 4116.6 1796 1908.4 5924.5 1271 5996.0 14076.2
FDI_out 1043           
           
           
           
          
           
          
          
           
          
          
          
           
          
           
           
       
       
170.7 397.9 1858 1492.8 3760.9 1315 7069.7 21027.4
FDI_in 950 1423.6 2351.9 1099 194.9 574.3 1204 7399.8 23227.0
home_GDP 1043 224847 229507 1858 1442356 2350017 1315 1313508 2257529
host_GDP 1043 1002276 1206128 1858 214753 232848 1315 1196615 1921242
home_ISO 1043 3302 6827 1858 14789 16952  1315 12054 15493
host_ISO 1043 14732 17537 1858 3039 6835 1315 11182 16123
host_Passengers 875 1.01 0.58 1858 0.45 0.81  1315 1.43 0.93
host_Road 647 167.6 91.8 1348 65.2 111.0  1315 118.0 85.3
host_Electricity 1043 8292.0 4493.8 1858 3373.6 2031.3 1315 9936.6 6056.1
rel_REER 584 0.99 0.16 1112 1.03 0.16  1315 1.00 0.12
rel_SMI 915 0.99 2.53 1576 139.81 934.99  1042 17.11 62.48
host_Polcon 1043 0.77 0.05 1804 0.61 0.23  1315 0.76 0.04
host_TCI 1043 5.82 0.68 1858 4.69 0.90 997 5.85 0.79
host_Tariffs 741 0.01 0.01 1225 0.03 0.03  1121 0.01 0.01
host_FCM 999 6.48 0.38 1858 4.95 1.19 954 6.37 0.47
host_HF 1043 3.40 0.92 1838 3.94 0.91 997 3.71 0.94
BIT 690 0.42 0.49  1198 0.48 0.50  957 0.00 0.05
FTA 690 0.12 0.33  1198 0.10 0.30  957 0.63 0.48
 
 Table #3 Gravity equation for Exports and outward FDI: Fixed-effects estimation results 
 Exports  FDI 
 LDC→DC DC→LDC DC→DC  LDC→DC DC→LDC DC→DC 
Regression # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
home_GDP 0.272** 0.237 0.288**  -0.354 -0.360 0.174 
 (0.121) (0.158) (0.125)  (0.293) (0.286) (0.311) 
host_GDP 0.803*** 0.650*** 0.523***  0.568 0.536*** 0.850*** 
 (0.240) (0.076) (0.087)  (0.588) (0.176) (0.320) 
home_ISO 0.116** 0.033 -0.008  -0.079 -0.059 0.064 
 (0.057) (0.050) (0.037)  (0.097) (0.126) (0.104) 
host_ISO 0.085 0.018 0.043  -0.330* 0.148** -0.022 
 (0.087) (0.031) (0.033)  (0.190) (0.071) (0.112) 
FDI_out -0.004 0.021 0.005     
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.011)     
FDI_in 0.043 0.023* 0.016     
 (0.029) (0.013) (0.010)     
host_Passengers  0.212*** 0.289***   -0.099 -0.363 
  (0.078) (0.100)   (0.187) (0.339) 
host_Road   0.006*    -0.004 
   (0.003)    (0.007) 
host_TCI -0.577    1.210**   
 (0.393)    (0.528)   
host_FCM  0.263***    0.406*  
  (0.076)    (0.223)  
Sims test (overall)a 1.35        
(7, 162) 
1.30        
(8, 216) 
1.02        
(8, 244)  
2.31**      
(5, 224) 
0.63        
(6, 390) 
1.02        
(6, 275) 
Sims test (ISO)a 2.19        
(2, 162) 
0.48        
(2, 216) 
0.65        
(2, 244)  
2.12        
(2, 224) 
0.05        
(2, 390) 
1.15        
(2, 275) 
Hausman test 
(overall)b
22.26***    
(7) 
31.92***    
(8) 
39.61***    
(8)  
16.06***    
(5) 
6.44        
(6) 
3.03        
(6) 
Hausman test (ISO)b 6.74**      
(2) 
1.69        
(2) 
1.63        
(2)  
4.33        
(2) 
2.07        
(2) 
0.19        
(2) 
R2 0.227 0.323 0.220  0.070 0.250 0.207 
Observations 868 918 1136  1043 1858 1315 
Clusters (Panels) 218 278 295  233 410 318 
* denotes p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
All variables are in logs; country-pair specific and time specific effects are suppressed. 
a The test statistic is F-distributed; degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
b The test statistic is χ2-distributed; degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
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 Table #4 Gravity equation for Exports & Outward FDI: First-differencing estimation 
results 
 Exports  FDI 
 LDC→DC DC→LDC DC→DC  LDC→DC DC→LDC DC→DC 
Regression # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
home_GDP 0.294*** 0.474*** 0.589***  -0.211 -0.377 0.260 
 (0.064) (0.162) (0.133)  (0.221) (0.372) (0.367) 
host_GDP 0.879*** 0.559*** 0.253***  0.802** 0.364* 0.326 
 (0.169) (0.094) (0.080)  (0.399) (0.191) (0.427) 
home_ISO 0.063** 0.089 -0.044  -0.023 -0.187 0.108 
 (0.028) (0.057) (0.027)  (0.053) (0.120) (0.121) 
host_ISO 0.086 0.004 0.062**  -0.045 0.109* -0.055 
 (0.059) (0.032) (0.027)  (0.149) (0.061) (0.121) 
FDI_out -0.001 0.002 0.020*     
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.011)     
FDI_in 0.028 0.016 -0.008     
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.012)     
host_Passengers  0.027 0.059   -0.184 -0.624 
  (0.052) (0.084)   (0.269) (0.383) 
host_Road   0.008***    -0.005 
   (0.003)    (0.011) 
host_TCI -0.185    -0.240   
 (0.154)    (0.418)   
host_FCM  0.229***    0.167  
  (0.056)    (0.215)  
R2 0.133 0.216 0.100  0.020 0.067 0.077 
Observations 613 524 625  761 1185 754 
Clusters (Panels) 159 217 245  182 375 272 
* denotes p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
All variables are in logs and first differenced. 
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